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I. INTRODUCTION
According to a survey conducted in 1997 for the National Science
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Foundation, over forty percent of Americans own personal computers.'
Although nearly every one of these computer owners at some point will
purchase and install software, most of them likely will never take the time
to read the agreements that accompany the software.2 Humorist Dave Barry
provides insight into the reason for such apathy in his satirical take on the
typical software agreement:
By breaking this seal, the user hereinafter agrees to abide by all the
terms and conditions of the following agreement that nobody ever
reads, as well as the Geneva Convention and the U.N. Charter and the
Secret Membership Oath of the Benevolent Protective Order of the
Elks[,] and such other terms and conditions, real and imaginary, as the
Software Company shall deem necessary and appropriate, including
the right to come to the user's home and examine the user's hard drive,
as well as the user's underwear drawer if we feel like it, take it or leave
it, until death do us part, one nation indivisible, by the dawn's early
light, in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, finders
keepers, losers weepers, thanks you've been a great crowd, and don't
forget to tip your servers.
This "contract" inadvertently highlights two key problems inherent in
the typical mass-market software licensing agreement: (1) the public is
powerless to negotiate; and (2) the terms often are perceived as exceedingly
broad and restrictive. The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
(UCITA) purports to resolve these issues by establishing the general
enforceability of such agreements, with certain qualifications related to
4
unconscionability, assent, and other caveats.
UCITA, however, does not resolve, or even purport to resolve,
another important issue: the tension between federal copyright law and
state contract law. Computer software falls within the purview of the
Copyright Act of 1976.5 Under the Act, software users are entitled to rights
1. See Science & Engineering Indicators 1998, the Use of Computer Technology in the
United States (visited Sept. 20, 1999) <http:/www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/seind98/access/
c7/c7s4.htm>.
2. Software agreements that appear on the packaging containing the installation CD or
diskettes are called shrinkwrap agreements; software agreements that appear on screen prior
to downloading software from the internet or prior to installation of the software are called
clickwrap agreements.
3. DAVE BARRY, DAvE BARRY IN CYBERSPACE 98 (1996).
4. See Draft of the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (visited Oct. 18,
1999) <http://www.law.upenn.edu:80/bllulc/ucita_99.htm> [hereinafter UCITA Draft].
Although UCITA establishes the general enforceability of shrinkwrap and clickwrap
agreements, both the blackletter text and the Reporter's Notes indicate important caveats
and protections for the licensee. For example, the text and notes make clear that general
issues of contract law remain, notions of unconscionability remain relevant, and new
protections have been added for consumers, such as cost-free refund rights, among others.
See id.
5. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541-2598 (codified as amended in scattered sections
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that often exceed those granted by software agreements. For example,
under the Act and federal case law interpreting the Act, users are entitled to
make a copy of the software for archival purposes or as necessary to use
the software; to reverse engineer software within certain limits; and to have
at least limited rights to transfer the software.6 Yet, software agreements
often attempt to place more narrow limits on these rights. Thus, a tension
between the federal Copyright Act and state contract law frequently arises.
The question then becomes which law, state or federal, should prevail, or
more specifically, should federal law preempt state law? UCITA suggests
that in general, state contract law should prevail, but it also concedes that
federal preemption remains a possibility.
This Note addresses UCITA's attempt to resolve the enforceability
issue; argues for an approach to preemption that promotes clarity and
preserves the objectives of Congress established by the Copyright Act;
discusses whether UCITA remains relevant in light of the preemptive
power of copyright law; and proposes that additional federal legislation is a
more appropriate solution to the problems surrounding computer software
reproduction and use. Part II discusses briefly the' enforceability of
shrinkwrap and clickwrap agreements, particularly in light of UCITA. Part
Ell outlines the two approaches to federal copyright law preemption of state
contract law and argues that section 301 of the Copyright Act is not theS7
appropriate vehicle for preemption. Part IV explores the preemption of
such agreements under general principles derived from the Supremacy
Clause. Part V addresses the relevance of UCITA in light of the preemption
issue and widespread criticism of UCITA.
IT. ENFORCEABILITY OF SHRINKWRAP AND CLICKWRAP
AGREEMENTS UNDER UCITA.
There are at least four potential arguments against the enforcement of
shrinkwrap and clickwrap agreements: (1) the contract is unenforceable due
to a lack of assent (depending on the location of the license within the
packaging); (2) the agreement is an unenforceable contract of adhesion; (3)
particular terms are unconscionable; or (4) for expensive software, the
contract is unenforceable under the statute of frauds. For a while, it
appeared that courts generally would refuse to enforce shrinkwrap and
clickwrap agreements, based on one or more of these arguments.8 However,
of 17 U.S.C.).
6. See infra Part IV.
7. See Dennis S. Karijala, Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line [sic]
Licenses, 22 U. DAYTONL. REv. 511, 525 (1997).
8. See Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 99 (3d Cir. 1991)
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courts appear increasingly willing to find such agreements enforceable.9
Continuing this trend of enforcement is the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), the organization
responsible for the promulgation of UCITA. In 1994, the NCCUSL, in
conjunction with the American Law Institute (ALI), began work on an
addition to the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), Article 2B, that would
address the enforceability of shrinkwrap and clickwrap licenses. 0 During
the drafting process, however, Article 2B came under heavy criticism from
consumer groups, writer and artist organizations, industry groups,
academics, and even members of the drafting committee itself." Thus, in
April 1999, the ALI withdrew its support for the fledgling legislation.
Without support from ALI, the legislation could not be proposed to state
legislatures as an addition to the UCC; nevertheless, the NCCUSL
continues to advocate the legislation's adoption. The NCCUSL changed the
name from Article 2B to UCITA and has retained the text of Article 2B
almost verbatim. 2 UCITA is complete, and the NCCUSL expects to
present the final version to state legislatures by the new millennium. 
3
Although UCITA renders shrinkwrap and clickwrap agreements
generally enforceable, it also explicitly recognizes the potential for federal
preemption while remaining neutral on the policy debates inherent in
preemption analysis. For example, although section 105 states that "[a]
(finding that a shrinkwrap license was unenforceable due to lack of assent); Foresight
Resources Corp. v. Pfortmiller, 719 F. Supp. 1006, 1010 (D. Kan. 1989) (noting in dicta that
"there is some reason to question the enforceability of any such agreement"); Vault Corp. v.
Quaid Software Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 750, 762-63 (E.D. La. 1987) (finding that under basic
contract law, the shrinkwrap agreement was an unenforceable contract of adhesion).
9. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding the
validity of a shrinkwrap license); see also Hotmail Corp. v. Van Money Pie, Inc., No. C-98
JW PVT ENE, C 98-20064 JW, 1998 WL 388389 at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 1998)
(upholding the validity of a clickwrap license).
10. See NCCUSL and ALl Announce Schedule for Completion of Uniform Commercial
Code Article 2b-Licensing (visited Oct 18, 1999) <http://www.law.upenn.edu/
library/ucl/ucc2b/2breleas.htm>. NCCUSL and ALI are responsible for drafting and
amending the UCC. See id. The UCC is a group of commercial transaction laws that are
proposed to state legislatures, who determine whether or not to adopt the UCC as state law.
Nearly every state has adopted the UCC with only minor variations to its text.
11. See Bad Softvare: What to Do When Software Fails, Some Organizations that Have
Opposed or Criticized UCITA (visited Oct. 18, 1999) <http://www.badsoftware.com/
oppose.htm>.
12. Compare UCITA Draft, supra note 4 with Uniform Commercial Code Article 2B
Draft (visited Oct. 18, 1999) <http:l/www.law.upenn.edulblllulc/ucc2b/2b898.htm>
[hereinafter Article 2B Draft].
13. See Bad Software: What to Do When Software Fails, July 29, 1999-UCITA Passes
NCCUSL (visited Oct. 18, 1999) <http:llwww.nmsvr.com/-kanerlwhatsnew.htm>
[hereinafter UCITA Passes NCCUSL].
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provision of this [Act] which is preempted by federal law is unenforceable
to the extent of such preemption,"14 it provides no further guidance on the
issue. Instead, the Prefatory Note states that UCITA will not choose sides
in the debate over the extent to which copyright law should preempt state
contract law and that the issue is "ultimately one of federal policy."'15
III. FEDERAL COPYRIGHT LAW VS. STATE CONTRACT LAW.
A. The Differing Approaches to the Preemption Question
How should the courts and Congress resolve the preemption issue?
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution states: "This Constitution, and
the [f]aws of the United States which shall be made in [p]ursuance thereof.
• . shall be the supreme [flaw of the [land . . . any [t]hing in the
Constitution or [flaws of any [s]tate to the [c]ontrary notwithstanding."'
6
This language makes clear that, under certain circumstances, federal law
may preempt state law. However, the various circumstances under which
preemption may occur has been described in a number of different ways,
resulting in little agreement regarding the appropriate categorization of the
various approaches to federal law preemption of state law. 7 For example,
the U.S. Supreme Court has articulated as few as two and as many as four
general categories.'8 Commentators likewise have found anywhere from
two to six categories. 9 Nevertheless, there seems to be at least some
agreement that preemption may be divided into two broad categories,
express and implied, with anywhere from two to four subcategories for the
latter. This Note groups preemption analysis into three general categories:
(1) express preemption, which occurs when the statute in question
expresses congressional intent to preempt state law in a specified field; (2)
implied preemption through federal law's exclusive occupation of a given
field; and (3) implied preemption through state law's conflict with the
objectives of federal law.20
14. UCITA Draft, supra note 4, § 105.
15. Article 2B Draft, supra note 11, § 2B-105(a).
16. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
17. See S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71
B.U.L. REv. 685, 733-35 (1991) (providing a detailed analysis of the myriad attempts to
categorize preemption precedent).
18. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984); Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04
(1983).
19. See Hoke, supra note 17, at 733 n.226.
20. See Hoke, supra note 17, at 734 n.228, 735 n.236; see also Stephen D. Otero, Note,
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With respect to copyright law, there are two potential avenues to the
preemption of state law: express preemption under section 301 of the
Copyright Act and preemption due to state law's interference with the
objectives of and policy decisions underlying the Copyright Act. This NoteS 21
refers to the latter form of preemption as Supremacy Clause preemption.
Under section 301 of the Copyright Act, federal copyright law preempts all
state "legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive
rights within the general scope of copyright. 22 Under a general Supremacy
Clause analysis, state law is preempted if it "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives ofC,,21
Congress. Stated differently, "the federal policy 'may not be set at
naught, or its benefits denied' by the state law."24 The difference between
these two approaches is clear. Supremacy Clause analysis would compel an
inquiry into the policy decisions underlying the Copyright Act, while
section 301 would require one to ask simply whether the state rights sought
to be enforced are equivalent to rights established by the Copyright Act.
As an initial matter, some argue that section 301 obviates the use of
Supremacy Clause analysis as an approach to copyright preemption.2 Such
an assertion, however, is not the most reasonable reading of section 301.
Clearly this section does not assert that it provides the only avenue to
copyright preemption of state law; instead, it attempts to make clear that
states may not pass laws intended to regulate rights identical to those
protected by the Copyright Act. Indeed, to remove the possibility of
Supremacy Clause analysis with respect to the Copyright Act would be
implausible, since either Congress would have to make clear that the
policies underlying the Act are subordinate to state policy choices in this
realm, or the Supreme Court would have to overturn the fundamental tenet
The Case Against FIFRA Preemption: Reconciling Cipollone's Preemption Approach with
Both the Supremacy Clause and Basic Notions of Federalism, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV.
783,788 (1995).
21. See Article 2B Draft, supra note 12, § 2B-105, Reporter's Note (referring to implied
preemption as "preemption under the Supremacy Clause"); ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL.,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGIES AGE 812-13 (1997) (labeling as
"Supremacy Clause preemption" any analysis that goes beyond § 301 to discuss whether the
state law in question is an "obstacle" to the objectives of the Copyright Act).
22. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994).
23. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (quoting Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S.
501,533 (1912)).
24. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964) ("When state law
touches upon the area of [patent or copyright statutes], it is 'familiar doctrine' that the
federal policy 'may not be set at naught, or its benefits denied' by the state law." (quoting
Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942))); see also Kewanee Oil Co.
v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
25. See MERGES ETAL., supra note 21, at 811.
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of implied preemption of state law. In fact, under analogous circumstances,
the Supreme Court recently found untenable the argument that an express
preemption clause in a federal statute eliminates the possibility of implied
26preemption of state law.
Several federal courts also have suggested that Supremacy Clause
analysis is still a viable approach to copyright preemption. For example, in
Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd.,27 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
applied a Supremacy Clause analysis to find that a state statute permitting
enforcement of shrinkwrap licenses was preempted under federal copyright
law.28 Also, in Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburg,29 the
Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that a
state statute regulating the licensing of motion pictures was preempted by
copyright law, noting that the "more general question of conflict between
the two statutory schemes under the Supremacy Clause is decisive."30
The one case that may call into question the viability of Supremacy
Clause preemption is ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg.31 The Federal District
Court for the Western District of Wisconsin initially found that the
agreement in question was preempted by copyright law, based upon
reasoning that combined section 301 analysis with public policy arguments
clearly implicating the Supremacy Clause approach:
It would alter the "delicate balance" of copyright law to allow parties
to avoid copyright law by contracting around it
•.. Contracts that are consistent with the copyright law's goals of
self-protection should be upheld. Rightful owners should be able to
define the limits of permissible copying or modification of their works.
...It is only when a contract erects a barrier on access to
information that under copyright law should be accessible that
[section] 301 operates to protect copyright law from individually
crafted evasions of that law.
Plaintiff's license agreement is an attempt to avoid the confines of
copyright law (citation omitted). Its prohibition on the distribution of
public information cannot be squared with the purposes of copyright
law .. ..32
The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion drafted by Judge Easterbrook,
26. See Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 208,287-88 (1995).
27. 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
28. See id. at 269-70.
29. 520 F. Supp. 971 (E.D. Pa. 1981); rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 683 F.2d
808 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 933 (1982).
30. Id. at 993.
31. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
32. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 658-59 (W.D. Wisc.), rev'd, 86 F.3d
1147 (7th Cir. 1996).
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reversed, holding that since contract claims are not "equivalent" to
copyright infringement claims, the contract should not be preempted.33
Although the Seventh Circuit's reliance on only section 301 could be
construed as an implicit rejection of the district court's inclusion of an
inquiry into the agreement's incongruance with the objectives of copyright
law, the fact that the Seventh Circuit completely ignored one obvious
foundation for the district court's opinion is oddly conspicuous. 34
Moreover, many scholars and commentators criticized this decision's
treatment of the preemption question.35 Thus, Judge Easterbrook's opinion
is hardly a convincing argument that preemption based upon a general
Supremacy Clause analysis should be rejected.
Since both avenues to preemption remain, the question becomes
whether both, one, or neither is the appropriate vehicle for preemption of
state contract law, or more specifically, for the preemption of shrinkwrap
and clickwrap licenses. Many courts and commentators, like the district
court in ProCD, Inc., analyzed a claim for copyright preemption of contract
law through an amalgam of the section 301 and Supremacy Clause
approaches. However, clarity calls for at least an attempt to retain a
distinction between the two, for a section 301 analysis that devolves into a
debate over the policy decisions underlying the Copyright Act is, in truth,
little more than a Supremacy Clause approach to preemption. Moreover,
the danger in combining the two approaches is evident from the ProCD,
Inc. reversal: Viewing the tests as parts of a whole can lead one to the
erroneous conclusion that a failure under section 301-that is, a finding
that the contract right is not equivalent to a copyright right-is the end of
the inquiry. If the district court in ProCD, Inc. bifurcated more explicitly its
inquiry, it may have forced Judge Easterbrook to address, or at least
acknowledge, the argument that the agreement was inconsistent with the
goals of copyright law. Thus, this Note addresses the two approaches
distinctly, beginning with section 301.
B. Preemption Under Section 301 of the Copyright Act
There is a strong, and perhaps convincing, argument that section 301
preemption is not available for state contract law. This argument proceeds
as follows. Section 301 preempts only state rights that are equivalent to
rights created under the Copyright Act. Contract rights derive not from the
33. ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1455.
34. See id.
35. See Karijala, supra note 7, at 521-25; see also MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B][1][a] (1998); Neil Weinstock Netanel,
Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 383-84 (1996).
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fact that the given work is protectable under the Copyright Act, but from an
agreement between the parties. Thus, the contract rights are not equivalent
to the copyright rights and should not be preempted under section 301. The
crux of this argument is that the extra element of bargain inherent in
contract rights renders contract rights innately different from copyright
rights. Proponents of this position also assert that freedom of contract
generally supports this argument.36
Little can be said for the contrary position. One potential argument for
preemption under section 301, at least in the context of mass-market
licenses of software, is that the element of "bargain" is missing since the
contract essentially is a contract of adhesion.37 However, there is a readily
apparent problem with such an assertion: it ignores the fact that contracts of
adhesion usually are enforced as an implied agreement between the parties.
Indeed, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (Restatement) has made this
point patently clear:
(1) Except as stated in [s]ubsection (3), where a party to an agreement
signs or otherwise manifests assent to a writing and has reason to
believe that like writings are regularly used to embody terms of
agreements of the same type, he adopts the writing as an integrated
agreement with respect to the terms included in the writing.
(2) Such a writing is interpreted wherever reasonable as treating alike
all those similarly situated, without regard to their knowledge or
understanding of the standard terms of the writing.
(3) Where the other party has reason to believe that the party
manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew that the writing
contained a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement.
38
Moreover, the comments to section 211 of the Restatement provide
compelling policy arguments for the necessity of adhesion contracts.
Utility of standardization. Standardization of agreements serves
many of the same functions as standardization of goods and services;
both are essential to a system of mass production and distribution.
Scarce and costly time and skill can be devoted to a class of
transactions rather than to details of individual transactions. Legal
rules which would apply in the absence of agreement can be shaped to
fit the particular type of transaction, and extra copies of the form can
be used for purposes such as record-keeping, coordination and
supervision. Forms can be tailored to office routines, the training of
personnel, and the requirements of mechanical equipment. Sales
personnel and customers are freed from attention to numberless
variations and can focus on meaningful choice among a limited
number of significant features: transaction-type, style, quantity, price,
36. See generally NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 35, § 1.01 [B][1][a].
37. See Karijala, supra note 7, at 527-29.
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1979).
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or the like. Operations are simplified and costs reduced, to the
advantage of all concerned.39
Both Article 2 of the UCC 40 and UCITA provide justifications for adhesion
contracts similar to those proffered by the Restatement.4'
Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that courts may place upon
adhesion contracts certain limitations, such as construction against the
drafting party and the unenforceability of terms that are unconscionable or
against public policy. Thus, for the argument supporting section 301
preemption to be successful, one must maintain either that in this context
the law should not imply a bargain between the parties or that despite this
implied bargain, issues of unconscionability or public policy should render
the contract or specific terms thereof unenforceable.
For the sake of clarity, these arguments should be resolved by turning
to basic contract law, not the preemptive power of federal copyright law. If
a clause or the entire agreement is determined to be unenforceable under
contract law, the owner of the work will have no other recourse than to turn
to other forms of protection, such as the Copyright Act. Thus, for a given
scenario, one might arrive at the same destination-application of
copyright law-but the path to that destination would be far more clear.
Why obfuscate the path with a preemption analysis when basic issues of
contract law would suffice?
Professor Dennis Karjala nevertheless makes this argument, but
attempts to do so on a broader scale.
The existence of an actual bargain in negotiated contracts distinguishes
state enforcement interests qualitatively from a copyright claim in that
context. The absence of bargaining with respect to widely distributed
works, however, leaves essentially no state interest in enforcing
"contracts" that eliminate restrictions on copyright rights other than the
very expansion of such rights that the contract seeks to achieve, which
makes the contract claim qualitatively the same as a copyright claim.
... It takes more, in other words, than a mere label from a state
statute or court that a claim is "contractual" to avoid preemption under
section 301. At the extreme, for example, a state statute might
otherwise simply declare that every sale of a copy of a
copyright-protected work automatically includes, as a part of the sale
contract, a term promising not to use in a competing work ideas or
facts contained in the protected work. A claim for wrongful use of the
ideas or facts under such a statute would be "contractual" only because
the state chose to attach that name. Whatever virtues such a statute
39. Id. at 120, § 211 cmt. a.
40. Article 2 of the UCC sets forth default rules for commercial sales transactions
generally.
41. See UCITA Draft, supra note 4, at Reporter's Notes, § 211.
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might otherwise have, it does not promote the stability and confidence
of personal business relationships that is the ground for nonpreemptive
deference to the enforcement of actual negotiated agreements, becauseS 42
its operation requires no such relationship as a predicate.
Although he makes a valiant effort to extend his argument beyond the
basic "no extra element because there is no bargain" formula, Professor
Karijala cannot completely escape that theme. In sum, he appears to argue
that the state interest in enforcing actually negotiated agreements is the
stability and confidence of personal business relationships, and, with
contracts of adhesion, there is no such state interest. However, this
assertion itself is questionable, for the enforcement of adhesion contracts
does promote stability in the market, or at least that view is generally
accepted. As noted earlier, these contracts are essential in the modem
economy. If adhesion contracts typically are enforced, why should an
adhesion contract that touches upon copyright issues be analyzed any
differently? At bottom, the arguments for doing so focus on the purposes of
the Copyright Act and how such contracts stand as obstacles to those
purposes. These arguments, therefore, should be viewed as arguments for
preemption under Supremacy Clause analysis and not as support for
preemption under section 301. To shoehorn the section 301 label onto such
arguments introduces needless complexity into the analysis and poses the
threat of a decision similar to ProCD, Inc., in which the court ignored
altogether the argument based upon interference with the objectives of
copyright law.
A few courts have taken a slightly more simplistic approach to
arguing that section 301 should provide for the preemption of some
contract clauses, arguing that when a contractual provision may be
breached by activity that also would create liability under the Copyright
Act, that provision should be preempted under section 301, since the
contract right then would be "equivalent" to a right created under the
Copyright Act. 43 For example, in Wolff v. Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers, Inc.," the Federal District Court for the Southern
District of New York held:
State causes of action are "equivalent" to the exclusive rights within
copyright law, and accordingly preempted by that statute, unless they
are "qualitatively different" from the rights granted under the
Copyright Act . . .. In the case at bar, [Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers, Inc.] breached its contract with plaintiffs ... by
infringing plaintiffs' copyright. It is difficult to see how the resulting
42. Karijala, supra note 7, at 527-28.
43. See NwNiER & NMER, supra note 35, § 1.01 [B][1][a].
44. 768 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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claims are qualitatively different. Accordingly[,] the breach of contract
claim is preempted.
Also, in American Movie Classics Co. v. Turner Entertainment Co.,6
the district court found a television performance license preempted, stating:
"[A] breach of contract claim is preempted if it is merely based on
allegations that the defendant did something that the copyright laws reserve
exclusively to the plaintiff (such as unauthorized reproduction,
performance, distribution, or display)." 47 Finally, in National Car Rental
System, Inc. v. Computer Associates International, Inc.,48 although
ultimately deciding against preemption, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals stated that it did "not need to decide whether a breach of contract
claim based [solely] on a wrongful exercise of one of the exclusive
copyright rights is preempted," citing cases that had found preemption
under those circumstances.49 Such broad statements often rely on citations
to the treatise Nimmer on Copyright; 50 however, this treatise does not
support such a simple statement of the issue.
First, Professor Nimmer never states specifically that contract
provisions that may be breached by unauthorized "reproduction,
performance, distribution, or display" should be preempted.5 Instead, he
states simply that "in essence, a right that is 'equivalent to copyright' is one
that is infringed by the mere act of reproduction, performance, distribution,
or display. 52 Indeed, Professor Nimmer concedes that in most contexts,
contracts should survive preemption under section 301. .
Professor Nimmer argues for section 301 preemption of shrinkwrap
contracts, but like Professor Karjala, he does so by using the adhesion issue
to bolster his position. 4 First, he notes that "a breach of contract cause of
action can serve as a subterfuge to control nothing other than the
45. Id. at 69.
46. 922 F. Supp. 926, 931 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
47. Id. at 931; see also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 35, § 1.01[B][l][a], at 1-16
n.68.4; Smith v. Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. 1297, 1307 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("To the extent
plaintiff rests his contract claim not on breach of the terms of the contract but on
Weinstein's having copied his property... it is of course preempted. Plaintiff cannot merely
rephrase the same claim citing contract law and thereby obtain relief equivalent to that
which he has failed to obtain under copyright law.").
48. 991 F.2d 426, 434 n.6 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 861 (1993).
49. Id. at 434 n.6 (8th Cir. 1993); see also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 35, §
1.01[B][1][a], at 1-16 n.69.
50. See, e.g., American Movie Classics Co., 922 F. Supp. at 931 and cases cited therein.
51. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 35, § 1.01[B][1][a], at 1-12.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 1-17.
54. See id. at 1-19.
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reproduction, adaptation, public distribution, etc. of works within the
subject matter of copyright., 55 He then combines this rather subjective
"subterfuge" element with concerns over adhesion: "That situation
typically unfolds when the 'contract' at issue consists of a 'shrinkwrap
license' to which the copyright owner demands adhesion as a condition to
licensing its materials."" This line of reasoning should be contrasted with
his comment on the decision in Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz:
57
The district court found pre-emption [sic], invoking the Sears/Compco
holding that "state laws are pre-empted [sic] when their scheme of
protection clashes with the objectives of the federal [copyright] laws."
Given that Acorn confronted not a state law, but rather a freely-
bargained contract among parties who understood its import, the court
erred in finding pre-emption [sic].
5 8
Thus, Professor Nimmer draws a distinction between freely bargained
contracts and mass-market agreements, hinting that when questions of
adhesion exist, the extra element of bargain, present in freely-bargained
contracts, is missing. As mentioned earlier, injecting a section 301
preemption analysis at this point only obfuscates the issue of enforceability
under contract law and ignores the necessary efficiency of adhesion
contracts.
A different situation arises when the contract in question is not
enforceable under state contract law, due to issues of unconscionability or
the like, but nevertheless is enforceable under a state law addressing
software licensing generally. In such a situation, preemption under section
301 may be appropriate, since the extra element of agreement, even an
implied agreement, is missing. This scenario arose in Vault Corp. v. Quaid
Software Ltd.,59 in which the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
contract in question would not be enforceable under basic contract
principles due to adhesion issues but would be enforceable, if not for
preemption, under Louisiana's software licensing statute. 6 Clearly,
however, it would not be proper to use such an example to support the
proposition that agreements, otherwise enforceable as adhesion contracts
under state law, sometimes may be preempted by section 301. In this
regard, it is important to note that UCITA purports to leave in place basic
notions of contract law; it does not attempt to render enforceable those
agreements that otherwise would not be enforceable due to issues of
55. Id.
56. Id. (emphasis added).
57. 657 F. Supp. 70 (W.D. Va. 1987).
58. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 35, § 1.01[B][1][a], at 1-17 n.71.
59. 847 F.2d 255, 270 (5th Cir. 1988).
60. See id. at 270.
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unconscionability, public policy, or the like.6' Thus, shrinkwrap and
clickwrap agreements held enforceable under UCITA should not be
preempted under section 301 of the Copyright Act.
62
In addition to the basic "extra element" argument against preemption
under section 301, two other arguments against preemption exist. First, the
legislative history of section 301 renders questionable the ability of section
301 to preempt state contract law. For example, the National Car Rental
court relied on the following language from the House committee report to
the Copyright Act: "Nothing in the bill derogates from the rights of parties
to contract with each other and to sue for breaches of contract."63 Although
Congress eventually removed the language that specifically exempted
contract claims and other specific state law claims from the preemptive
effect of section 301, the court found that congressional intent weighed
more heavily in favor of nonpreemption of contract claims:
[T]he facts surrounding the deletion of [section] 301(b)(3) suggest
Congress did not intend to reverse the presumption of non-preemption
[sic] for the examples initially included in [section] 301(b)(3). Instead,
it appears that certain members of the House were concerned about the
subsequent addition of the tort of misappropriation to the list of non-
preempted [sic] causes of action, and suggested deletion of the specific
examples in order to prevent confusion about the scope of preemption
.... [T]he better view is that the legislative history suggests a
congressional intent not to preempt breach of contract actions ....
Second, the following argument proffered by Judge Easterbrook in
ProCD deserves consideration:
Rights "equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general
scope of copyright" are rights established by law-rights that restrict
the options of persons who are strangers to the author. Copyright law
forbids duplication, public performance, and so on, unless the person
wishing to copy or perform the work gets permission; silence means a
ban on copying. A copyright is a right against the world. Contracts, by
contrast, generally affect only their parties; strangers may do as they
please, so contracts do not create "exclusive rights." Someone who
found a copy of [plaintiffs software] on the street would not be
affected by the shrinkwrap license-though the federal copyright laws
of their own force would limit the finder's ability to copy or transmit
the application program.
61. See UCITA Draft, supra note 4, at Prefatory Note, § 211.
62. Whether such agreements nevertheless should be preempted under the Supremacy
Clause is addressed infra Part IV.
63. National Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 433
(8th Cir. 1993) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 132 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5748).
64. Id. at 433-34.
65. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996).
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Judge Easterbrook concluded that the above distinction renders
contract rights inherently different from rights created under copyright law
and, therefore, not subject to section 301 preemption. Interestingly, the
Reporter's Notes to the original UCC Article 2B Draft also relied on this
argument to support its conclusion that section 301 generally should not
preempt contracts. The Reporter's Notes, however, stated the proposition
more succinctly: "[A] contract deals with the relationship between parties
to an agreement, while property law in the Copyright Act deals with
interests good against persons with whom the property owner has not
dealt.""
Nevertheless, this argument appears vulnerable on at least two fronts.
First, it assumes that shrinkwrap licenses do not create rights against the
world, when, in fact, they attempt just such a result by purporting to bind
anyone who uses the software. On a theoretical level, however, the
argument retains some attraction, since a contract claim could be brought
only against parties to the agreement. Thus, if someone indeed found an
unlabeled diskette containing software, and if, upon installation, a licensing
agreement did not appear on screen, the user of the software would be
bound only by the constraints of intellectual property law. Second,
Professor Netanel attacks this argument by maintaining that Judge
Easterbrook "blithely eluded the argument that standardized contracts that
systematically proscribe user copying of public domain material may
frustrate the social policy behind copyright law's delicate balance of
incentive and access." 67 This attack, although considerable, addresses
preemption under the Supremacy Clause analysis and not under section
301. Thus, at least with respect to preemption under section 301, Judge
Easterbrook's argument remains theoretically intact.
In light of the foregoing, shrinkwrap and clickwrap licenses should
not be considered preempted under section 301 of the Copyright Act. If an
adhesion shrinkwrap contract or contract clause is questionable due to
issues of unconscionability or the like, the more appropriate approach is to
analyze enforceability under basic contract principles, and then turn to
copyright law if the plaintiff brings such an alternative claim.
Nevertheless, as noted by Professor Netanel, some clauses,
particularly those contained in standardized, mass-market agreements, may
implicate the social-policy decisions underlying the Copyright Act. In such
a situation, preemption analysis under the Supremacy Clause is warranted.
Under this approach, the pertinent question becomes whether enforcement
of certain provisions contained in software licensing agreements "stands as
66. Article 2B Draft, supra note 12, at 2B-105 Reporter's Note 2.
67. Netanel, supra note 35, at 384.
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an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress."68
IV. LIMITATIONS ON COPYRIGHT RIGHTS AND THE SUPREMACY
CLAUSE
A. The Balance of Copyright Law
The Copyright Act provides that the owner of a copyright has the
right to reproduce the copyrighted work, to prepare derivative works of the
copyrighted work, and to distribute copies of the copyrighted work to the
public.69 Although Congress granted a broad range of rights to the
copyright owner, it chooses to limit significantly those rights through the
fair use doctrine, first sale rights, the idea/expression dichotomy, and other
70limitations. Since fair use is the objective of Congress that is most
frequently cited as being blocked by shrinkwrap and clickwrap agreements,
the following discussion focuses upon this limitation.7'
Section 107 of the Act provides a nonexhaustive list of factors to be
considered in determining whether the fair use limitation should apply in a
given case: the purpose and character of the use, the nature of the
copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality of the portion used, and
the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work. Some typical examples of fair use include reproduction
for the sake of "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
scholarship, or research
'72
The predominate view in both case law and commentary is that the
fair use doctrine, as well as the other limitations on the copyright
monopoly, is intended to strike a balance between the incentive to create
that is generated by the copyright owner's right to control an expressive
work and the public benefit derived from the ability to make use of that
work.73 As Professor Netanel notes:
Copyright law strikes a precarious balance. To encourage authors
to create and disseminate original expression, it accords them a bundle
of proprietary rights in their works. But to promote public education
68. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
69. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
70. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
71. See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1239, 1247 (1995); Netanel, supra note 35, at 305.
72. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
73. See generally Netanel, supra note 35 (discussing various perspectives on the proper
balance to strike between these competing interests); Karjala, supra note 7 (arguing that this
balance should not be upset by the private reordering of contractual arrangements).
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and creative exchange, it invites audiences and subsequent authors to
use existing works in every conceivable manner that falls outside the
province of the copyright owner's exclusive rights.
74
Professor Mark A. Lemley reaches a similar conclusion: "The
intellectual property laws are decidedly instrumental in nature-they are
written to achieve specific purposes .... [A]Il of the intellectual property
laws reflect a series of compromises between different affected parties."
75
Moreover, Professor Lemley sees this compromise as necessary to the
achievement of a uniquely constitutional goal: "The Congress shall have
Power .... To promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience and the useful [a]rts, by
securing for limited [t]imes to [a]uthors and [i]nventors the exclusive
[r]ight to their respective [w]ritings and [d]iscoveries. ''76 He observes that
"[t]his is one of the few clauses in the [U.S.] Constitution which explicitly
conditions a grant of power on the achievement of a goal. 77 The fair use
compromise created by Congress furthers the constitutional goal, for it
allows authors and others to bring to market expressive works of
potentially great public benefit that are made possible only through the
"fair use" of another's expressive work.
The full purpose and objective of Congress is clear: to promote the
progress of science and the useful arts by striking a balance between the
copyright owner's ability to control expressive works and the public's
interest in access to and limited use of expressive works. It follows,
therefore, that state rights which upset this balance will be at odds with
federal policy, indeed with a congressional attempt to fulfill a specific
constitutional mandate. Thus, contract provisions that attempt to
circumvent the doctrine of fair use, a key to this congressional balance,
stand as obstacles to the full purpose of Congress and should be preempted
under the Supremacy Clause. In this regard, it is important to note that,
early in the drafting process, the potential for Supremacy Clause
preemption was not lost on the NCCUSL, for in the Reporter's Notes to
Article 2B, the reporter stated: "In some cases, preemption may arise under
the federal constitutional Supremacy Clause. 78  This language is
conspicuously missing from the Reporter's Notes to UCITA.
Under general Supremacy Clause analysis, not under section 301, the
distinction between two-party, bargained agreements and mass-market
adhesion contracts becomes significant. A bargained agreement between
74. Netanel, supra note 35, at 285.
75. Lemley, supra note 70, at 1275.
76. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
77. Lemley, supra note 70, at 1275 n.159.
78. Article 2B Draft, supra note 12, at 2B-110 Reporter's Note 2.
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two parties poses little threat to the purposes of Congress for the following
reasons: one can presume safely that such contracts are not likely to be
widespread and that the parties (if they have similar bargaining power)
have taken into account the fact that, absent a contract, the user would be
entitled to fair use of a publicly available work, the purchaser of the
software would also have a first sale right, and other issues related to
copyright. However, mass-market adhesion contracts pose a much greater
threat to the purposes of Congress for the following reasons: they purport
to bind all who use the software; they are pervasive; there is great inequity
in bargaining power; and consumers often do not understand the copyright
issues involved. Thus, software companies frequently will be able to use
such agreements to bind consumers to contracts that impinge upon
limitations important to the balance struck by the Copyright Act. Although
apparently reluctant to characterize this concern as a preemption issue, the
Reporter's Notes to UCITA reach a similar conclusion in its discussion of
"public policy invalidation":
A term or contract that results from an informed private agreement
between commercial parties should be presumed to be valid .... On
the other hand, terms in a mass-market license that prohibit persons
from observing the visible operations or visible characteristics of
software and using the observations to develop non-infringing
commercial products, that prohibit quotation of limited material for
education or criticism purposes, or that preclude a public library
licensee from making an archival copy would ordinarily be invalid in
the absence of a showing of significant commercial need.
79
B. Common Terms and Preemption
Having determined that UCITA remains vulnerable to copyright
preemption, the following discussion explores how the preemption question
may become relevant to typical mass-market software licenses. Below are
some common terms that appear in software licenses. They are presented to
illustrate how software agreements may implicate fair use, as well as other
limitations on copyright, such as the related limitation of reverse
engineering and the first sale doctrine:
Software
You may install and use one copy of the SOFTWARE
PRODUCT, or in its place, any prior version for the same
operating system, on a single computer. The primary user of the
computer on which the SOFTWARE PRODUCT is installed
may make a second copy for his or her exclusive use on either a
home or portable computer.
80
79. UCITA Draft, supra note 4, § 105 Reporter's Note 3.
80. Microsoft OfficeTM 4.2.1, End User License Agreement for Microsoft Software
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You may [i]nstall the [s]oftware in a single location on a hard
disk or other storage device of up to the number of computers
indicated in the upper right-hand comer of this Agreement...
[You may] [m]ake one backup copy of the [s]oftware, provided
your backup copy is not installed or used on any computer ....
The primary user of each computer on which the [s]oftware is
installed or used may also install the [s]oftware on one home or
portable computer. However, the [s]oftware may not be used on
the secondary computer by another person at the same time the
[s]oftware on the primary computer is being used.
8
'
Reverse Engineering
You may not reverse engineer, decompile, or disassemble the
SOFTWARE PRODUCT, except and only to the extent that such
activity is expressly permitted by applicable law not
withstanding this limitation.
8 2
[Y]ou agree not to modify, adapt or translate the [s]oftware. You
also agree not to reverse engineer, decompile, disassemble or
otherwise attempt to discover the source code of the [s]oftware.
3
First Sale Rights
You may not rent or lease the SOFTWARE PRODUCT ....
You may permanently transfer all of your rights under the
[agreement], provided you retain no copies, you transfer all of
the SOFTWARE PRODUCT (including all component parts, the
media and printed materials, any upgrades, this [agreement], and,
if applicable, the Certificate of Authenticity), and the recipient
agrees to the terms of this [agreement]. If the SOFTWARE
PRODUCT is an upgrade, any transfer must include all prior
versions of the SOFTWARE PRODUCT.8
4
You may not rent, lease, sublicense or lend the [s]oftware or
[d]ocumentation. You may, however, transfer all your rights to
use the [s]oftware to another person or legal entity provided that
you transfer this Agreement, the [s]oftware, including all copies,
updates and prior versions ... and all [d]ocumentation to such
person or entity and that you retain no copies, including copies
stored on a computer.85
1. Terms Restricting the Copying of Software
After a review of these clauses, it becomes clear that, when read in
light of section 117 of the Copyright Act, many software licenses do not
(1995).
81. Adobe Acrobate TM 3.0, End User License Agreement (1995).
82. Microsoft OfficeTM i 4.2.1, supra note 80.
83. Adobe Acrobate m 3.0, supra note 81.
84. Microsoft OfficeM 4.2.1, supra note 80.
85. Adobe AcrobateTm 3.0, supra note 81.
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violate the fair use allowance to make copies. Section 117 of the
Copyright Act provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an
infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make
or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that computer
program provided:
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential
step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction
with a machine and that it is used in no other manner, or
(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes
only and that all archival copies are destroyed in the event that
continued ossession of the computer program should cease to
be rightful.8
7
Of course, if a software license attempted to create more narrow
limits on the ability to make copies, such a clause should be preempted.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reached an opposite conclusion;
however, it based its decision on an overly narrow reading of the statute.8
It reasoned that section 117 requires the person making the copy to be "an
owner of a copy," and since the user in that case was a "licensee," section
117 was not applicable.8s There are two problems with this argument. First,
since nearly all software agreements are characterized as licenses, this
approach would render section 117 moot. Second, it ignores the threat of
preemption under a Supremacy Clause analysis, for not allowing the user to
exercise those rights established under section 117 clearly would stand as
an obstacle to congressional objectives.
2. Terms Restricting Reverse Engineering
Although software companies appear eager to comply with section
117, they have ignored precedent on the right of software users to reverse
engineer.9 This right is not established by statute, but most courts agree
that reverse engineering is protected fair use, at least under certain
circumstances.91 Most of these decisions note that the right exists only to
the extent that the reverse engineering is undertaken to utilize
86. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 109(b)(1), 117 (1994).
87. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1994).
88. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 n.5 (9th Cir. 1993);
see also MERGES ET. AL., supra note 21, at 929 (noting that this reasoning would read
"section 117 out of the Act altogether").
89. MAISys. Corp., 991 F.2d at 518 n.5.
90. Reverse engineering is the process by which software developers decompile
software to determine how it operates and how to develop new software that is compatible
with the software which is being reverse engineered.
91. See Lemley, supra note 70, at 1247 n.31.
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uncopyrightable material. Nevertheless, such activity often could result in
the creation of new and useful software products. Clearly, in light of the
constitutional goal of promoting the progress of science and the useful arts
through the balance established in the Copyright Act, a prohibition of such
activity would stand as an obstacle to the full purpose of Congress. Thus,
under the Supremacy Clause analysis, such restrictions on reverse
engineering should be preempted. Indeed, the MicrosoftTm clause on
reverse engineering all but concedes this point with its caveat that reverse
engineering is allowed when "expressly permitted by applicable law
notwithstanding this limitation.
9 2
3. Terms Restricting First Sale Rights
Whether typical restrictions of first sale rights violate the Copyright
Act's mandates on the subject is not clear. The pertinent portions of section
109 state:
[Tihe owner of a particular copy... lawfully made under this title...
is entitled, without authorization of the copyright owner, to sell or
otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy ....
[U]nless authorized by the owners of copyright . . . in a computer
program ... [no] person in possession of a particular copy of a
computer program ...may, for the purposes of direct or indirect
commercial advantage, dispose of, or authorize the disposal of, the
possession of that ...computer program ...by rental, lease, or
lending, or by any other act or practice in the nature of rental, lease, or
lending.... The transfer of possession of a lawfully made copy of a
computer program by a nonprofit educational institution to another
nonprofit educational institution or to faculty, staff, and students does
not constitute rental, lease, or lending for direct or indirect commercial
purposes under this subsection.
93
Clauses that purport to limit a software user's right to resell the
software typically attempt only to ensure that the software user does not
retain copies of the software, which seems to be a reasonable limitation in
light of the analogous situation involving the sale of a book, magazine, or
the like. However, limitations on the right to rent or lend are more
problematic. Section 109(b)(1)(A) provides that such activity indeed is
prohibited, but only if its purpose is to compete directly or indirectly with
the copyright owner.94 Lending to a friend would appear to fall outside of
section 109's definition of prohibited conduct, but within the typical
software agreement's limitation. Thus, a tension between the Copyright Act
and state contract law again arises, and a preemption analysis becomes
92. Microsoft OfficeTM 4.2.1, supra note 80.
93. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a)-(b)(1)(A) (1994).
94. See id. § 109(b)(1)(A).
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necessary.
The preceding paragraph illustrates how clauses may arise that are
questionable in light of the fair use doctrine or other limitations of
copyright but that do not blatantly offend such doctrines. When such
provisions are challenged with a claim of preemption, inconsistent and
unpredictable results may occur. In such a scenario, however, UCITA is of
no assistance, for it remains neutral on the policy issues inherent in
Supremacy Clause preemption.
4. Potential Solutions
In light of the current confusion over enforceability and preemption,
solutions should be explored on a federal level. Allowing states to address
the problem individually will only perpetuate inconsistency and
inefficiency. One potential solution is to create a new, sui generis form of
intellectual property protection for computer software. Indeed,
commentators have presented many compelling arguments for such a
solution: the need for shorter monopoly duration due to the "importance of
improving existing programs" and the "relatively short commercial life of
most application programs;" the clear importance of reverse engineering in
the computer industry; and software vulnerability to "rapid imitation."
95
Another possible solution is to amend the Copyright Act, an approach
often employed by Congress. Congress passed early copyright statutes with
primarily printed materials in mind; and as technology progressed, it
amended copyright law accordingly. For example, with the advent of sound
recordings, existing sections of the current Act were amended and new
sections were added to address problems specific to that medium. Recently,
sections have been added and amended to clarify many rights relative to
96
computer software. However, further modification of existing copyright
law is necessary if Congress retains copyright law as the primary protection
for computer software. In light of the foregoing discussion, Congress
should amend the Copyright Act to make clear that mass-market licenses
are generally enforceable but may not attempt to limit fair use or reverse
engineering rights.
V. THE FUTURE OF UCITA: IS IT RELEVANT?
UCITA implicitly comports with the Author's proposed approach to
95. MERGES ET" AL., supra note 21, at 1027-28 (1997) (citing Peter S. Menell, Tailoring
Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1329 (1987); Pamela
Samuelson, et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 2308 (1994)).
96. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 109(b)(1), 117 (1994).
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the preemption issue (the rejection of section 301 preemption and the
applicability of general Supremacy Clause preemption), but it
underestimates the impact and scope of preemption under a general
Supremacy Clause analysis. This issue raises the question of UCITA's
viability.
Shrinkwrap and clickwrap licenses have three primary goals: to
disclaim warranties, to limit liability for the breach of warranties, and to
prohibit or limit the copying and use of material protected under the
Copyright Act. If one concludes, as UCITA concedes, that preemption
remains a viable option, anytime a mass-market licensing term goes beyond
the confines of the rights granted under copyright law, a defendant could
argue that the term should be preempted. If successful, the software
licenser's "contract" rights would be limited to only those rights that are
allowable under the Copyright Act. Some software manufacturers seem to
concede this issue, as demonstrated by their use of language identical to
that contained in pertinent sections of the Copyright Act, and by blanket
concessions such as the following: "You may not reverse engineer,
decompile, or disassemble the SOFTWARE PRODUCT, except and only
to the extent that such activity is expressly permitted by applicable law
notwithstanding this limitation." 97 In the end, the only remaining purposes
for creating shinkwrap and clickwrap agreements arguably could be to
disclaim warranties and to limit liability for breach of warranty, thereby
calling into question the efficacy of passing legislation as extensive as
UCITA. If states begin to question the efficacy of UCITA, its future
becomes questionable.
Of course, one could argue that shrinkwrap and cickwrap agreements
serve additional purposes beyond the most obvious three mentioned above.
First, one could argue that they serve an informational function, that is, to
make explicit what the copyright owner considers to be its rights under
copyright law.9' Although this purpose arguably is significant, it also could
be accomplished by a statement, on the packaging or on screen, that does
not purport to be a binding agreement. Second, one could argue that clauses
contained in shrinkwrap agreements may go beyond the typical rights
created under copyright law without obstructing the full purposes of
Congress, thereby allowing the software producer to create useful and
important limitations beyond the basic precepts of copyright. However, the
97. Microsoft OfficeTm 4.2.1, supra note 80.
98. Indeed, it appears that some software manufacturers concede that many clauses are
merely informational, through their adoption of language identical to that of the Copyright
Act or through other caveats based explicitly upon intellectual property law. See supra note
92 and accompanying text.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
success of this argument depends on how broadly one reads the full
purpose of Congress in the realm of copyright law. It seems that such
scenarios would be rare indeed if one considered the "full purpose of
Congress" with regard to copyright law to be the precise balance struck by
the rights and exceptions established in the Copyright Act and case law
interpreting that Act.
Another obstacle to UCITA's future is the vehement opposition it has
received from many different sources.99 Indeed, a particularly
unprecedented development occurred recently when fourteen state
attorneys general voiced opposition to UCITA in a letter to NCCUSL.'00
Such widespread refutation of UCITA's approach could cause states to
question further its efficacy.
Although shrinkwrap and clickwrap agreements may serve some
limited purposes beyond placing limits on the reproduction and use of
software, those purposes are either questionable or may be accomplished
without passing extensive legislation. This fact, combined with the
widespread criticism of and opposition to UCITA, renders its future far
from certain. Of course, one should not discount the lobbying power of
software giants that have much to gain from the adoption of UCITA.
Whether this influence is able to offset the criticism and arguable
irrelevance of UCITA remains to be determined.
VI. CONCLUSION
Shrinkwrap and clickwrap agreements increasingly are being deemed
enforceable, and UCITA stands ready to lend further support to that
movement. Although such agreements should not be preempted under
section 301 of the Copyright Act, preemption under the Supremacy Clause
remains a viable option. Indeed, UCITA itself hints at such vulnerability.
Although many courts and commentators addressed the preemption
issue through an amalgam of section 301 and a general Supremacy Clause
analysis, doing so poses the threat of a decision similar to ProCD, Inc., in
which the court ignored the fact that the agreement may have interfered
with the objectives of the Copyright Act. Thus, when faced with an
allegedly questionable shrinkwrap contract or clause, this Note proposes an
inquiry that proceeds as follows. Analyze the agreement or clause under
basic principles of contract law to determine enforceability. If it is not
enforceable due to issues of unconscionability or the like, the owner of the
99. See Some Organizations That Have Opposed or Criticized UCITA, supra note 11.
Some entities that have voiced opposition include consumer groups, writer and artist
organizations, industry groups, and academics.
100. See UCITA Passes NCCUSL, supra note 13.
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work is left with no recourse for protection other than intellectual property
law such as copyright or patent law, thereby obviating the need for section
301 preemption analysis. If the clause is enforceable, one should turn to the
Supremacy Clause analysis and discern whether enforcement would stand
as an obstacle to the full objectives of Congress.
Although this approach is clearer than combining the two avenues to
preemption, if Supremacy Clause analysis is necessary, the inquiry could
become complex in application and, admittedly, may be prone to
inconsistent results. Unfortunately, UCITA would not bring the law any
closer to solving this problem, since it attempts to remain neutral on the
policy issues inherent in the preemption question. Considering the
economic importance of software use and development, consistency and
predictability are a desirable goal. Thus, the most appropriate response to
this issue is federal legislation not a patchwork of questionable state laws.
In particular, Congress should amend the Copyright Act to make clear that
mass-market licenses generally are enforceable, but may not attempt to
limit fair use, reverse engineering rights, or other rights key to copyright
law's careful balance.

